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Defender Operational Log: The Event IDs That Matter

Which Microsoft Defender Antivirus events to read in an investigation: 1116 and 1117 with their fields, failed actions, quarantine, history and tampering.

Published on 12 min read

TL;DR. The Defender Operational log, Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational, is the first Defender source to read. 1116 is a detection and 1117 the action taken on it; 1118 and 1119 mean the action failed. 1009, 1011 and 1013 record a restore from quarantine, a deletion from quarantine and deleted detection history. 5001, 5010 and 5012 record protection being switched off, 5007 any configuration change with the old and new registry value, and 5013 a change that tamper protection blocked. Filter on the numeric IDs, not on the names, which are in the system's language. The detection user is often SYSTEM, and no event says who changed a setting. Defender Parser reads the log together with the other Defender artifacts and joins them per detection.

Where the log is

  • Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational, provider Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender.
  • File: C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender%4Operational.evtx. A second Defender channel, Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender%4WHC.evtx, sits next to it.
  • Event Viewer: Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > Windows Defender > Operational.
  • Reference: Microsoft lists every ID with its symbolic name and fields in Microsoft Defender Antivirus event IDs and error codes. It is a troubleshooting page. What each event means for an investigation is this article's reading, not Microsoft's.

The log rolls over at its maximum size, and routine events such as signature updates fill it. Check the oldest event before you conclude that something is absent. The DetectionHistory files and the MPLog files are kept separately and often reach further back.

The events worth reading

IDMeaningWhy it matters
1116Malware or unwanted software detectedThe detection: threat, path, source, process
1117Action taken on a detectionQuarantine, Remove, Clean, Block, Allow...
1118Action failed, not criticalThe threat may still be present
1119Action failed criticallyMicrosoft notes that the endpoint might not be protected
1006, 1007, 1008Detected, action taken, action failedA second family with the same three steps; Microsoft documents both, so search for both
1015Suspicious behaviour detectedBehaviour detections, with a target file name
1120Hashes deduced for a threat resourceOnly when the ThreatFileHashLogging policy is set
1121An attack surface reduction rule fired in block modeASR blocks, with the path
1009, 1010Item restored from quarantine, restore failedSomeone wanted the file back
1011, 1012Item deleted from quarantine, delete failedThe sample may be gone from the quarantine
1013, 1014Detection history deleted, delete failedRoutine purge or cleanup, see below
5000, 5001Real-time protection enabled, disabled5001 in an incident window is a lead
5004A real-time protection feature's configuration changedFeature-level changes
5007Configuration changed, with old and new valueExclusions and every other setting
5009, 5010Scanning for malware and unwanted software enabled, disabledProtection switched off
5011, 5012Scanning for viruses enabled, disabledProtection switched off
5013Tamper protection blocked a changeAn attempt that failed
1150Service healthyHourly heartbeat, where reported
1151Health reportVersions, signature age, protection states, last scans
3002, 3007A real-time protection feature failed, recoveredGaps in protection
5008Engine failure (crash or hang)Gaps in protection
2000, 2001Signatures updated, update failedSignature versions before and after
2010Cloud protection delivered extra security intelligenceSignatures that arrived outside the regular updates
2050File submitted for sample analysisFull path and SHA-256 of the file
1000, 1001, 1002Scan started, finished, stoppedScan type and user

1116 and 1117: the detection and the action

Microsoft's page describes the fields in prose. The names below are the EventData names as they appear in a 1116 recorded in 2026 for the Sigma project's regression tests, which is also what EvtxECmd, Dissect and most SIEM pipelines expose.

FieldWhat it holds
Detection IDA GUID for this detection. The same value appears in 1117 and names the DetectionHistory file
Detection TimeWhen the threat was detected, ISO 8601 in UTC with a Z. In the Sigma sample it is 20 ms before the event's own time
Threat ID, Threat NameA numeric ID and a name such as Trojan:Win32/CryptInject!MSR
Severity ID, Severity NameLow, Moderate, High, Severe
Category ID, Category NameTrojan, Tool, Virus...
Source ID, Source NameWhat triggered the scan: user, system, real-time, IOAV (downloads and attachments), NIS, IEPROTECT, ELAM, remote attestation, AMSI, UAC
Process NameMicrosoft describes it only as the process in the PID. It can be Unknown
Detection UserOften NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, see below
PathThe detected resources, each with a type prefix
Origin ID, Origin NameLocal computer, network share, internet, incoming or outgoing traffic, unknown
Execution ID, Execution NameNot explained on Microsoft's event page
Type ID, Type NameHeuristics, generic, concrete, dynamic signature
Action ID, Action NameIn 1117: what Defender did
Error Code, Error DescriptionAn HRESULT, 0x00000000 on success
Additional Actions ID, Additional Actions StringFurther steps still needed; No additional actions required in the Sigma sample
Remediation UserNot explained on Microsoft's event page; empty in the Sigma sample
Security intelligence Version, Engine VersionSignature and engine versions at detection time

Fields named Unused to Unused6 are empty placeholders.

Reading the Path field

The path carries a type prefix. In the Sigma 1116 sample it is file:_C:\Users\...\svchost.exe. A detection can cover several resources separated by ; : the Sigma 1009 sample has a file:_ resource followed by a service:_ resource holding a PowerShell command line. An AMSI detection has no file at all: Microsoft's AMSI demonstration shows an amsi: resource naming the host process, \Device\HarddiskVolume3\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe. Strip the prefix before you match paths against other artifacts.

Names are translated, IDs are not

The Sigma samples were recorded on a French Windows: Category Name reads Cheval de Troie, Source Name reads Système, Action Name reads Non applicable. A filter on Source Name = System finds nothing on that host. Filter on the ID fields, and keep the names for display.

Detection source

Source Name tells you how the file reached the engine: real-time protection on access, a user or scheduled scan, IOAV for downloads and attachments, AMSI for script content. Do not rely on it alone. In Microsoft's AMSI demonstration, the test detection is reported with Detection Source: System, while its path has the amsi: prefix. Check both.

Detection User and Process Name

Both are leads, not attribution. Detection User is NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM in Microsoft's AMSI demonstration, where an administrator runs the test script, and its French equivalent in the Sigma sample. Process Name is Unknown in the Sigma sample. Take the user from the path when it is inside a profile, from the DetectionHistory file, which keeps a user per detection, and from logon sessions.

A detection is not an execution

A 1116 shows that Defender saw the content, not that it ran. Real-time protection scans files when they are written and opened, and IOAV scans downloads. Execution Name is not documented on the event page; the WMI class behind Get-MpThreatDetection has a similar enumeration, CurrentThreatExecutionStatusID (Unknown, Blocked, Allowed, Executing, NotExecuting), described in MSFT_MpThreatDetection. Treat it as a hint and prove execution elsewhere.

The action in 1117

Microsoft lists the actions as Clean, Quarantine, Remove, Allow, User defined, No action and Block. Allow, No action and None do not remediate. When the default action for a severity is set to None, Defender writes the 1116 and then a 1117 with Allow: the threat was seen and left in place. Microsoft adds that these actions cannot be configured while tamper protection is on, so a 1117 Allow on a tamper-protected host deserves a question.

When the action fails

1118 and 1119 carry an Error Code. Microsoft's page lists the Defender-specific values, for example 0x80508022 (a reboot is required to complete removal), 0x80508023 (the threat is no longer present, or malware is preventing the scan) and 0x80508026 (removal inside this container type is not supported). Any failed action means the file, or the process, may still be there.

Quarantine and history events

  • 1009, restored from quarantine. Someone used Windows Security or MpCmdRun.exe -Restore to get the item back. In the Sigma 1009 sample, the event carries Domain, User and SID fields naming an account. A restore in an incident window is worth a full look.
  • 1011, deleted from quarantine. The sample is no longer in the quarantine folder. Its hashes may still be in the DetectionHistory file, and an older copy of the folder may survive in a Volume Shadow Copy.
  • 1013, history deleted. Microsoft's own description gives a purge of the history as an example of when it fires, and Defender removes scan history items after 30 days by default (Microsoft). A 1013 alone is not anti-forensics. A 1013 minutes after a detection, with an interactive account in its user field, deserves the attention you would give a cleared log.

Protection state and configuration

  • 5001, 5010, 5012: real-time protection, malware scanning or virus scanning turned off. Look for the matching 5000, 5009 or 5011 that turned it back on.
  • 5007: every configuration change, with Old Value and New Value holding a registry path and a value. In the Sigma samples, an added exclusion reads New Value: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths\C:\AtomicRedTeam = 0x0 with an empty Old Value, and a cloud setting change reads from Default\SpyNet\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen = 0x0 to HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\SpyNet\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen = 0x1. The event's security user ID is S-1-5-18, the service itself: 5007 never names the person.
  • 5013: tamper protection blocked a change, and the event's Value names the registry value and the data that was refused. The Sigma rule matches values ending in \Real-Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring, \Real-Time Protection\DisableBehaviorMonitoring, \Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware and similar. In a Microsoft Tech Community thread, an administrator confirmed that Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true produces a 5013 on a tamper-protected host, and also found about 25 of them at each Group Policy refresh: Configuration Manager policies rewriting protected values under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender, even when the data did not change. Read the setting, the data and the timing before you call a 5013 an attack.

Bhabesh Raj's 2020 write-up searches for a 5007 whose old value ends in TamperProtection = 0x5 and new value in TamperProtection = 0x4, as the trace of tamper protection being switched off. Microsoft does not document these values; read them as on and off with that caveat. The attacker side of all this is in Defender exclusions and tampering.

Health, failures and gaps

  • 1150: Microsoft describes it as reported every hour when the antimalware platform reports its status to a monitoring platform. Where a host writes it, a gap of several hours on a machine that was running points to a stopped service, a cleared log or a machine that was off: check the System log for uptime and for event 104, which records a cleared log.
  • 1151 is a health report that includes the real-time protection, on-access, IOAV and behaviour monitoring states, the signature versions and age, and the last quick and full scan times. A state that changes between two reports is a pointer to the 5000-series events around it.
  • 3002, 3007, 5008: a real-time protection feature failed or recovered, or the engine crashed or hung. Microsoft recommends a full scan after 3002 and 3007, because the system may not have been protected for some time.
  • 2050: a file sent to Microsoft for analysis, with its full path and SHA-256. It is one of the few places where the log itself gives a hash.

Joining the log with the other Defender sources

KeyIn the Operational logElsewhere
Detection ID1116, 1117DetectionHistory file name; Get-MpThreatDetection on a live host
Threat ID1116, 1117, 1009, 1011Quarantine entry; resource scan and threat action blocks in MPLog
Path and time1116DETECTIONEVENT and DETECTION_ADD lines in MPLog; quarantine entry
SHA-2562050DetectionHistory tracking data
Registry value5007, 5013SOFTWARE hive, with the key's last write time

Tools

  • EvtxECmd has maps for 1116, 1117, 5001, 5007 and other Defender events.
  • Dissect's defender.evtx plugin returns every field listed above.
  • Sigma has rules for AMSI detections, added exclusions, tamper protection triggers, restored quarantine files and deleted history.
  • Defender Parser reads the EVTX with the quarantine, DetectionHistory, MPLog, MpCmdRun.log and the SOFTWARE hive, joins the detections across them, and shows protection changes on one timeline.

Pitfalls

  • Time zones. The event time is stored in UTC; Event Viewer displays it in the analyst's local time. Detection Time is UTC with a Z.
  • Translated names. Filter on IDs.
  • The user. Neither 1116 nor 5007 reliably names the person.
  • Absence. A missing 1116 can mean an excluded path, real-time protection off, a rolled-over log or a file Defender does not detect. Each has its own trace.

FAQ

What is the difference between event 1116 and event 1117?

1116 is the detection: Defender found malware or unwanted software, and the event gives the threat name, the path, the detection source and the process. 1117 is the action Defender then took on it, such as Quarantine, Remove, Clean, Block or Allow. A 1116 followed by 1118 or 1119 instead means the action failed, and the threat may still be on the machine.

Does a 1116 event prove that the malware ran?

No. Many detections happen when a file is written, extracted or downloaded, before anything runs. Use the detection source and the timing as leads, and prove execution with Prefetch, Amcache, process creation events or EDR data.

Why does the Detection User field say SYSTEM?

The field does not always name the person behind the file. Public samples, including Microsoft's own AMSI demonstration, show NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Take the user from the path, from the DetectionHistory file, from logon sessions and from per-user artifacts.

Which event shows that someone added a Defender exclusion?

5007, configuration changed. Its New Value field holds the registry value that was written, for example a value under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths. The event does not say who made the change: look at PowerShell logs and history for that.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between event 1116 and event 1117?

1116 is the detection: Defender found malware or unwanted software, and the event gives the threat name, the path, the detection source and the process. 1117 is the action Defender then took on it, such as Quarantine, Remove, Clean, Block or Allow. A 1116 followed by 1118 or 1119 instead means the action failed, and the threat may still be on the machine.

Does a 1116 event prove that the malware ran?

No. Many detections happen when a file is written, extracted or downloaded, before anything runs. Use the detection source and the timing as leads, and prove execution with Prefetch, Amcache, process creation events or EDR data.

Why does the Detection User field say SYSTEM?

The field does not always name the person behind the file. Public samples, including Microsoft's own AMSI demonstration, show NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Take the user from the path, from the DetectionHistory file, from logon sessions and from per-user artifacts.

Which event shows that someone added a Defender exclusion?

5007, configuration changed. Its New Value field holds the registry value that was written, for example a value under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths. The event does not say who made the change: look at PowerShell logs and history for that.

Related articles

A worked case: a quarantined backdoor, a refused attempt to stop real-time protection, two exclusions and an AMSI detection, joined across Defender sources.
How to collect Defender's Operational log, MPLog, DetectionHistory, quarantine, MpCmdRun.log and SOFTWARE hive with robocopy /B, wevtutil, KAPE or Velociraptor.
How to read Microsoft Defender's DetectionHistory files: threat, status, resources, hashes, user, process and times, and how they join 1116 and the quarantine.