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Runs in your browser · nothing is uploaded

Read what Microsoft Defender saw, did and was told to ignore.

Its quarantine, DetectionHistory, MPLog, Operational event log, MpCmdRun.log and exclusions, joined into one detection and tampering timeline. Quarantined files are described, never shown, and leave only as an encrypted ZIP.

Drop Defender's folders, its event log or a collection

Defender's Quarantine, DetectionHistory and Support folders, its Operational event log, MpCmdRun.log and the SOFTWARE hive, or a .zip, .tar.gz or folder holding them (KAPE WindowsDefender + RegistryHivesSystem, Velociraptor).

Folders · .zip · .tar.gz · loose files

The sample is FIN-WKS-07, a Windows 11 workstation on the day a rogue account staged tools: Defender caught one, was asked to switch off, and was told to ignore a folder. As KAPE collects it. Everything in it is synthetic: the quarantined files are harmless text and the threat names are made up.

Runs entirely in your browser: files are never uploaded.

Collect Defender's files and keys

Defender's folders under C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender are readable by administrators and SYSTEM only. The Operational event log is open while Windows runs: export it. The SOFTWARE hive is locked: save it or take it from a triage tool.

  1. Copy the folders, export the log
  2. Drop the folder or the archive here
  3. Read in your browser, never uploaded
Command Prompt · administrator
set CASE=E:\case\%COMPUTERNAME%\C
robocopy "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender" "%CASE%\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /E /B /COPY:DAT /DCOPY:T /XD "Definition Updates"
wevtutil epl "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational" "%CASE%\Defender-Operational.evtx"
robocopy C:\Windows\Temp "%CASE%\Windows\Temp" MpCmdRun.log* /COPY:DAT
rem Each user's own MpCmdRun.log, if they ran MpCmdRun.exe:
for /d %u in (C:\Users\*) do robocopy "%u\AppData\Local\Temp" "%CASE%\Users\%~nxu\AppData\Local\Temp" MpCmdRun.log* /COPY:DAT
reg save HKLM\SOFTWARE "%CASE%\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE"

From an elevated Command Prompt. robocopy /B (backup mode) reads the folders whatever their permissions; /XD skips the large Definition Updates folder. wevtutil epl exports the Operational log (any file name with "Defender" and .evtx is recognised). reg save writes the SOFTWARE hive. Keeping the C\ProgramData\… and C\Windows\… layout under a folder named after the host lets the tool place the files. In a batch file, double the % of %u and %~nxu.

Before you start

  • The quarantine holds live malware, RC4-encrypted with a key that is public. Handle the copy as malware: store it encrypted, do not open it on a workstation.
  • Collect early: the Operational log rolls over, MPLog files rotate, Defender purges quarantined items and detection history after a while, and an intruder with administrator rights can delete them.
  • Your own antivirus may react to the collected files: ResourceData is encrypted, but the logs name threats.
  • mpenginedb.db (Defender's SQLite database in Scans) is not read by this tool.

What Defender leaves behind

Microsoft Defender Antivirus, built into Windows 10 and 11, keeps several records of its work: an event log, plain-text support logs, one file per detection, an encrypted quarantine that still holds what it caught, a log of its command-line tool, and its settings in the registry.

Read together, they say what was detected, where, by which process and user, what Defender did about it, and who weakened Defender before or after: a switch turned off, a blocked attempt, an exclusion added minutes after a tool was quarantined.

The artifacts and where they live

  • Operational event log: C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender%4Operational.evtx. 1116 (detected) and 1117 (action taken) carry the threat, path, process, user, detection source and action; 1118/1119 a failed action; 5001, 5004, 5007, 5010, 5012 and 5013 settings changes and blocked attempts; 1009, 1011 and 1013 quarantine and history actions.
  • DetectionHistory: …\Windows Defender\Scans\History\Service\DetectionHistory\<nn>\<GUID>, one binary file per detection, named by its Detection ID: threat, resources with tracking data (hashes, size), user, process, status and the quarantine entry it went to.
  • Quarantine: …\Windows Defender\Quarantine\Entries\{GUID} (the threat, when, and each resource with its path, size and times), ResourceData\<xx>\<ID> (the content: what Windows' BackupRead returned for the file, RC4-encrypted) and Resources\<xx>\<ID> (which entries hold a content).
  • MPLog and MPDetection: …\Windows Defender\Support\MPLog-*.log, MPDetection-*.log. Defender's troubleshooting log: cloud (SDN) queries naming files with their hashes, programs it scanned files for, detections, exclusions, versions.
  • MpCmdRun.log: C:\Windows\Temp\MpCmdRun.log, and %TEMP%\MpCmdRun.log of a user who ran MpCmdRun.exe: each run's command line and times.
  • SOFTWARE hive: Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions (Paths, Extensions, Processes, IpAddresses, TemporaryPaths), Real-Time Protection, Spynet, Features (TamperProtection), and the same under Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender.

What they prove, and what they do not

  • That a file or script content was present and detected, where, when, through which source (real-time, AMSI, download, scan) and what Defender did. A detection on write or download does not prove the file ran.
  • The quarantined file itself, with its owner and, when it had one, its Zone.Identifier stream: the zone and the URL it was downloaded from.
  • That a file existed, with its hashes, even when nothing was detected: MPLog's cloud queries and estimated-impact lines.
  • Defense evasion: exclusions, switches set to off, tamper-protection blocks (an attempt that failed), quarantine restores, history deletions, MpCmdRun options that roll back protection.
  • Absence proves little: excluded folders and processes, anything Defender does not detect and anything that ran while it was off leave no detection.

How the tool reads them

  • Everything is read in your browser, in a Web Worker. The Operational log goes through EVTX Parser's WebAssembly reader; every other format has its own bounded reader, fuzz-tested against damaged and crafted files.
  • Detections are joined: the log's events by Detection ID, the DetectionHistory file by the same ID (its name), the quarantine entry by the GUID the history file names (else by threat, path and time), MPLog's lines by threat, path and time. Each join shows its evidence.
  • Quarantine entries and ResourceData are decrypted with Defender's published RC4 key. The content is described (streams, size, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, owner, Zone.Identifier) and never shown. It leaves the page only as a ZIP encrypted with the password "infected", on an explicit click.
  • Times: the event log, DetectionHistory, the quarantine and MPLog lines ending in Z are UTC. MPLog lines without a zone and MpCmdRun.log are shown as written and kept off the UTC timeline. Registry keys are dated by their LastWrite time, shared by all their values.
  • Files are placed on hosts by their collection path (KAPE's C\ folder, Velociraptor's C%3A, a host folder above them); loose files are recognised by name and content.

Limits

  • Microsoft documents the events, not the files. The quarantine, DetectionHistory and MPLog layouts come from public research (Fox-IT, Orange Cyberdefense, libyal, Yamato Security, Intrinsec) and can change with Defender's platform versions; values whose meaning is not known are kept and shown as unnamed.
  • In the raw event log, some name fields (Source Name, Action Name…) hold message-table references such as %%818; the tool then names the ID from documented tables and says so.
  • The ResourceData file name matched the SHA-1 of the whole decrypted content on the samples examined publicly, not the file's own hash; few samples exist.
  • TamperProtection's values are not documented by Microsoft; 5 = on and 4 = off come from one public source.
  • Devices managed by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint may not keep readable exclusions in the registry; an empty Exclusions key is not proof that there are none.
  • mpenginedb.db is not read, hive transaction logs are not replayed, sparse quarantined files are not rebuilt.
  • A flag is a reason to look, not a verdict.

Questions

Are my files uploaded?

No. The page reads the files in your browser with JavaScript and WebAssembly in a Web Worker; nothing is sent to a server. You can disconnect from the network once the page has loaded.

Is it safe to load a quarantine here?

The quarantined content is decrypted in memory only to describe it and to hash it; it is never rendered, never run and never saved raw. If you ask for it, it is written into a ZIP encrypted with the password "infected". Treat that ZIP as live malware.

Why does the detection time differ from the event's time?

1116 carries a Detection Time field; the event itself is written a moment later, and 1117 when the action finishes. The tool shows the Detection Time as the detection's time and keeps the event times with each event.

Why are some MPLog lines not on the timeline?

Lines ending in Z are UTC. Newer logs also write times without a zone, and public samples disagree on what zone those are in, so the tool shows them as written and leaves them off the UTC timeline. MpCmdRun.log writes local time without a zone too.

An exclusion is in the registry: when was it added?

The registry keeps one LastWrite time per key, shared by all its values: it dates the latest change to the key. A 5007 event, when the log still has it, dates each change and gives the old and new value.

Can it read a disk image?

Export the Defender folders, the Operational log, MpCmdRun.log and the SOFTWARE hive with Disk Image Parser or another forensic tool and drop the folder here. The page also accepts files handed over by Disk Image Parser, tab to tab, without a server.

How to collect Defender's Operational log, MPLog, DetectionHistory, quarantine, MpCmdRun.log and SOFTWARE hive with robocopy /B, wevtutil, KAPE or Velociraptor.
How to read Microsoft Defender's DetectionHistory files: threat, status, resources, hashes, user, process and times, and how they join 1116 and the quarantine.
How intruders weaken Microsoft Defender with exclusions, Set-MpPreference and MpCmdRun, and where it shows: 5001, 5007, 5013, the registry, PowerShell.